Categories
Uncategorized

Cheap Flights to San Jose – Learn About the SJC Airport, Airlines, & Savings Opportunities

[ad_1]

Have you been searching the internet for cheap flights to San Jose, CA? It’s a popular city that has a large international airport (SJC). San Jose is a hot spot for business travelers and leisure travels alike, due to its rich cultural history and convenient location in Silicon Valley.
trivago vacation packages
Several airlines across the world fly to/from SJC, including Alaska Airlines, Air China, Fiji Airways, Aeromexico, Al Nippon, American Airlines, United, Delta, JetBlue, Southwest, and more. With all of these domestic and international airlines flying in and out every single day, it’s not difficult to obtain affordable airfare. The most popular flights to San Jose are on Alaska Airlines, American Airlines, and Aeromexico.
cheap tickets
You can usually find some of the cheapest flights from nearby cities like Los Angeles, Las Vegas, and Long Beach. However, cheap flights to San Jose can still be found in other cities across the country – namely Chicago and Denver. Don’t just look for deals offered by the larger airlines, as Spirit, JetBlue, and Frontier offer airfare at really low prices. Although it’s almost always better to book early, if you’re almost out of time and need to be in the Silicon Valley area soon, Southwest is a good choice of an airline for last minute direct flights to San Jose.
cheap tickets
Regardless of when you need to go and from which city you plan to depart, it’s best to use a travel website that will allow you to search across a large number of airlines and deals to find cheap flights to San Jose.

Adding a Hotel to Cheap Flights to San Jose

Need a hotel? Some of these travel sites will offer you the option to book your hotel in addition the flight. When combining the two expenses together, there are usually huge discounts involved. Whether you’re only planning to stay for a few days or an entire week, it will likely be cheaper to combine airfare with lodging rather than pay for the two separately.
cheap all inclusive vacation packagese
When should you go? The best time to travel to Northern California is from June to September, when the temperatures are warm during the day, but not blistering hot, and cooler at night. It’s also the time of year when the Jazz Festival is held, which is filled with entertainment and delicious cuisines.
search airfare deals
There is no shortage of attractions in the Silicon Valley, from Alum Rock Park to the Repertory Theater. You will be able to enjoy more activities from the money you save on cheap flights to San Jose.
cheap tickets
Did you know that when going online, you can search over 400 airlines and 320,000+ hotels to find the best travel deals? Using the search tools is the easiest way to find cheap flights to San Jose as well as a hotel room, car rental, dining discounts, and more.

[ad_2]

Categories
Uncategorized

Cheap Flights From Austin Guide – All You Need to Know About the Airport, Airlines, & Flights

[ad_1]

Whether you live in the capital city of Texas or are simply passing through, you can use online airfare pricing tools to help you find cheap flights from Austin. The airport offers tons of nonstop flights to areas in North and South America and Europe.

The major airlines all serve the Barbara Jordan Terminal, and a few bargain airlines like Allegiant, Sun Country, and Via Air serve the South Terminal. American Airlines tends to offer very low airfare out of Austin to other major cities, like Chicago and Miami. If you need to fly to South American countries like Brazil, check out what Delta has to offer. There are dozens of other airlines as well, offering both domestic and international flights.

The Austin Bergstrom Airport (AUS) serves over 10 million passengers annually. There are over 150 departures every single day to nearly 50 destinations. Southwest is its largest carrier, but the other big name airlines operate at a huge volume as well.

If you're interested in some REALLY cheap flights from Austin, you might want to head to Orlando, Denver, Phoenix, or Vegas. No matter which part of the country you need to visit, you should be able to find low airfare to a nearby major city. If you need to get to an international city, it might take a bit of time doing some price comparison on discount travel sites, but you should be able to find whatever you need. If you need to fly to London from Austin, you might be able to save if you take a connecting flight to Dublin. It depends on the time of year and weather conditions. Nonstop flights are available to London as well, although they might not always be the cheapest option.

Where to Park When Taking Cheap Flights from Austin

There are several parking garages and parking lots near the Austin airport, so if you plan to return to the city after a few days, you have no shortage of parking spaces to choose from. There are a variety of both self-park and valet options. You can take a shuttle to and from the parking area and airport entrance in just a matter of minutes. Complimentary veteran parking is available for vehicles displaying license plates with a DV or other Military Honors designation.

If you can't find a good deal today, don't worry – there will be plenty of chances in the future. There are multiple flights available from Austin to all major cities a week. If you want to fly to Vegas, for instance, there are nearly 30 flights a week from the AUS airport. Just sign up to receive deal alerts and install discount travel apps on your phone to track airline prices. Keep an eye out and you'll surely find cheap flights from Austin.

Use online discounts to get not only cheap flights from Austin , but affordable hotel rooms, car rentals, dining packages, and more.

[ad_2]

Categories
Uncategorized

The Difference Between Finding a Cheap Domestic versus a Cheap International Airfare

[ad_1]

While US domestic airfare is a lot more volatile (i.e. prices change a lot more frequently) the price difference between major travel sites such as Orbitz, Travelocity, Expedia, and the airlines sites is often no more than 10-20%. Sellers of domestic airfare pretty much fall into 2 categories: (1) the airlines and (2) online travel agencies. There are a few niche players but they service a very small market. Therefore, when shopping for domestic airfare deals the “when to buy” is commonly more important than the “where to buy.”

The opposite is true when securing an international airfare bargain. The “when to buy” is still important (as in don’t wait until the last minute) but the “where to buy” is a lot more important. This is because airfare to Europe, Asia, Africa, and South & Central America are somewhat less volatile (may not change as frequently) but the price difference between different vendors can sometimes be as much as 50% or more. There are several reasons why that is but the two major reasons are (1) the type of fares that are offered and (2) the number of players in the field.

The Type of Fares

Without getting very technical there are basically 2 types of international airfare; published and unpublished. In the domestic market 97% of leisure fares are published (give or take). A published fare you can refer to as a retail fare. The airline creates the fare and the rules associated with that fare and then publishes the information through a clearing house called ATPCo (Airline Tariff Publishing Company). ATPCo then distributes the fare to the global distribution systems. Online and offline travel agencies in turn retrieve these published fares via one or more of these systems. Everybody has access to the fare. An unpublished fare (also referred to as a negotiated fare) is still being released via ATPCo but part of the “fare rules” is an indicator of what seller is allowed to access and sell the fare. It is essentially a private fare. One other difference is that published fares have to be sold at the price determined by the airline (no mark-ups or mark downs) while a private fare can be marked up. That is why you see online and offline agencies add a service charge of anywhere between $5 and $50 to a published fare ticket. With a negotiated fare the airline will receive a set amount and the seller is allowed to mark up (add his/her margin) to that fare. So, a seller may negotiate a $300 fare from New York to London with airline X and then mark it up and sell it for $345. Another visible difference between a negotiated and a published fare is the fact that on many (almost all) negotiated airline tickets you will not see the actual price you paid for the ticket. Instead you will either see a much higher fare or only tax information. A published fare tickets will show exactly what you paid for the ticket (excluding any service charges). As a general rule, negotiated fare tickets are frequently cheaper than published fare tickets (There are instances when an airline may have a “fire sale” that undercuts the fare levels of negotiated fares) and that is why “the where” is more important than “the when” when it comes to buying international airfare.

Sellers of Travel

Sellers of international airfare fall into the following major categories:

(1) Major Airlines

(2) Charter Airlines

(3) Online Travel Agencies

(4) Offline Travel Agencies

(5) Global Consolidators that sell to the Public

(6) Global Consolidators that do not sell to Public

(7) Ethnic Consolidators or Destination Specialists

(8) Student Travel Consolidators

(9) Tour Operators

Major Airlines

These are the carriers we are all familiar with such as American Airlines, United Airlines, Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Lufthansa, British Airways, KLM and many more. They offer airfare via their own website and many of the other sellers listed above. They may offer web specials on their own site. They do not charge a service fee.

Charter Airlines

In Europe this type of airline is a lot more common than in the US. A charter is basically when a tour operator “rents” or “charters” an airplane to fly vacationers from their departure gateway airport to the destination airport. There are a few airline companies that offer service from/to the US that have their roots in the charter business. They regularly offer year round or seasonal service to/from a few select US airports to a single country. They are FAA approved and must meet all airline safety rules & regulations. What sets them apart is their business model that allows them to commonly sell seats cheaper than the majors. Some of these alternative airlines are LTU, Condor, FlyGlobespan, or Martinair to name a few. They usually also do not charge a service fee.

Online Travel Agencies

Players in this category are Travelocity, Orbitz, Cheaptickets, Expedia, Priceline, Hotwire and so on. They sell published and unpublished airfare. They charge a service fee. They also habitually try to sell you other travel components such as hotel accommodation, car rentals, attraction tickets and/or travel insurance. If you are going overseas for a vacation buying a package (where the seller will bundle an air component with one or more land components) can be an option and may save you money. In a future article I will cover the advantages and disadvantages of packages.

Offline Travel Agencies

Also referred to as brick and mortar travel agencies, these are the traditional agencies that you would walk into, sit down and book your travel. Depending on size and target market they may also double as an ethnic consolidator or destination specialist. They also have access to consolidator fares not offered directly to the general public. Brick and mortar agencies almost always charge a service fee.

Global Consolidators that Sell Directly to the Public

Many times these are travel agencies that have decided to “cut out the middleman” and go directly to the airlines to negotiate their own private fares. This allows them to then re-sell them at a lower price without losing their margin. In order to get decent private fares a global consolidator would have to offer $100 Million+ in annual agency sales. Most of the negotiated tickets are sold without a service fee. If a consolidator sells a published fare they regularly add a service fee.

Global Consolidators that do not Sell Directly to the Public

In the days prior to online internet travel very few agencies would act as their own consolidator. Instead they worked through middlemen (consolidators) that negotiated deals with the airlines. A consolidator would negotiate that same $300 deal mentioned above, add his margin and then sell it to a retail agency. The retail agent would then add her margin and sell it to the public. As the Internet took shape, agencies could reach a much larger audience and therefore gained the clout to negotiate directly with the airlines. Nevertheless, there are still many agencies, offline and online that offer middlemen consolidator airfares. Due to the sheer volume consolidators can offer to an airline these fares could still be a bargain even after several mark-ups.

Ethnic Consolidators or Destination Specialists

These are probably one of the least known (by the general public that is) sources for inexpensive airline tickets. They are also some of the hardest to find. The US is a nation of immigrants and ethnic consolidators have traditionally serviced their ex-patriot or immigrant community. They were and still are the cheap sources for airfare back to the home country. Unlike global consolidators that can turn over $250 Million+ in sales a year these ethnic outlets may only turn over $2-5 Million a year but most of that can go to 1 or 2 carriers. They are highly specialized and have long-standing relationships to their preferred carriers. These long-term, reliable relationships are the reason why some ethnic mom and pop operations are able to secure airfare rates that are 20-30% lower than any of the online mega agencies. Destination specialists are similar to ethnic consolidators in terms of size and style. They have become true experts in a country or region and have built relationships. The difference is that often they are targeting the foreign independent traveler (FIT). Like I mentioned, the airfare bargains some of these outlets can offer are often hard to beat but the challenge is finding them. Google and Yahoo and any of the other search engines often do not find them.

Student Travel Consolidators

As the name suggests these are agencies that target students (and in some cases faculty). Just like a global consolidator, they approach the airlines and negotiate special discounts or private fares. The difference is that according to the agreement with the airlines they are only allowed to sell to bona fide students (and faculty) only. Frequently, the students have to be enrolled in an accredited college or university and high school students are not eligible. The same is true for faculty. Some agencies are better than others in ensuring that the person buying the ticket actually is a student.

Tour Operators

Tour Operators are entities that sell vacation packages such as all-inclusive, etc. They negotiate deals with airlines, hotels, ground operators and so forth, package them together, mark them up and then sell them as one product to the public. On occasion they will sell just the airfare (at rock bottom prices) in order to fill empty seats on the plane. Since they have a fixed price that they have to pay the aircraft operator, any empty seat is a missed opportunity. The best chance to get one of these cheap seats is usually to the Caribbean or Mexico.

Sources for international airfare bargains are plentiful. Finding the right one at the right time may make all the difference in whether you get a good fare or a great deal. While getting a domestic airfare deal is often the result of (lucky) timing getting a great international deal is frequently the result of knowing where to look.

[ad_2]

Categories
Uncategorized

The Best Airlines to Fly to USA

[ad_1]

Delta Air Lines

Delta Air Lines is a major American airline based in Atlanta, Georgia that operates an expansive domestic and international network. Delta serves flights from London Gatwick, Manchester, Edinburgh, Dublin and Shannon to its main hubs at New York JFK, Cincinnati and Atlanta.

Continental

Headquartered in Houston, Texas, Continental Airlines is the fourth-largest airline in the U.S.

The airline flies to Newark and Houston from all major UK airports including London Gatwick, Manchester, Birmingham, Bristol, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dublin, Belfast and Shannon.

Virgin Atlantic

Richard Branson’s Virgin airline operates long-haul routes between the United Kingdom and North America from its main base at London Heathrow. The airline has smaller bases at London Gatwick and Manchester Airport. Virgin’s flights to USA include Newark International Airport, New York JFK, Baltimore, Washington Dulles, Boston, Chicago, Miami, Orlando, Las Vegas, Los Angeles and San Francisco.

American Airlines

Honored as the largest U.S. airline, AA is based at Fort Worth, Texas, adjacent to the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport. American operates scheduled flights from London, Manchester and Dublin to Boston, New York JFK, Chicago, Raleigh/Durham, Dallas, Miami and Los Angeles.

British Airways

The British flag carrier serves a huge amount of international flights to USA from UK. The airlines is one of the preferred carriers to fly from London to New York JFK, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington Dulles, Atlanta, Orlando, Los Angeles and many more. British Airways also offers flights to Canada including the international airports at Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver.

[ad_2]

Categories
Uncategorized

Top 5 Airline Companies

[ad_1]

There are several airline carriers that provide domestic and international flights. While some only service regional airports, others offer multiple routes and are known the world over. When it comes to selecting the top airline companies, there are a lot of factors to consider. This includes passenger satisfaction, along with the volume of timely arrivals and departures. Airlines are also judged and weighed according to the services they offer. In fact, industry ratings and passenger testimonials can literally break or make any domestic or global airline. While we all have differing opinions, industry experts have selected the following companies as the top airlines in the world.

Delta Airlines

Delta is synonymous with first class services. As an industry leader in commercial aviation, Delta offers the most international flights out of the U.S. With its hub in Atlanta, Delta also offers an extensive fleet of planes for optimal convenience. This includes the elegant and lavish 747, along with the MD 88 and 90. Delta has also been praised for its customer service and ease of booking flights. With a friendly and courteous staff, Delta guaranteed top notch services for all domestic and international passengers.

United/Continental Airlines

Both United and Continental Airlines have been around for years. When these global brands decided to merge, it was simply a marriage made in heaven. With its hubs in Chicago, Denver, and now San Francisco for Pacific routes, United remains a dominant force in the commercial airways industry. With both non-stop and connecting flights, United offers a myriad of routes and ticket specials on a daily basis. While their fleet is not as extensive as Delta, the recent merger with Continental is slated to propel United to the top of the ladder soon.

Southwest Airlines

No airline list is complete without Southwest Airlines in the mix. As the top rated airline company for low cost rates, Southwest is heralded for its convenience and practicality. While regional in nature, Southwest now flies direct to many national destinations.

American Airlines

American Airlines used to be major player back in the early days of commercial aviation. In fact, it had a long standing rivalry with Pan-Am airways and other defunct airlines. Today, American Airlines still has a loyal and faithful passenger base. Most of their customers, however, have been enticed by Delta and other major carriers over the years.

U.S. Airways

Last but not least is U.S Airways. While ranking fifth on this list, its merger with America West has increased both its fleet and passenger base.

[ad_2]

Categories
Uncategorized

Keeping Your Carry-On Carry-Able (in Airline Standards)

[ad_1]

Wouldn’t it be a lovely and joyous world if airlines had consistent restrictions for the size and weight of carry-on bags? Well, your dreams are now squished like the mammoth carry-on you tried to fit in the overhead compartment on your last flight. Not all airplane overhead storage is created equal. Every airline company bases their bag restrictions on the internal configurations of their fleet. Which means, in short, a bag could be carried on one flight but must be checked on another.

Luckily domestic airlines like US Airways, Delta, American, and United agree on their max size, 22 x 14 X 9 inches. Unfortunately, most wheeled luggage pushes those dimensions to the breaking point. I myself have had to gate check a bag because the wheels were just too big for the overhead compartment to close.

A few domestic airlines are more generous with their bag restrictions. Alaska Airlines allows a whopping 24 x 17 X 10 inches (so passengers can fit their parkas on board, we assume). AirTran and Southwest allow 24 by 16 by 10 inches. Unless you’re carrying bricks, carry-ons are rarely weighed but there are technically limits. Be sure your carry-on bag doesn’t exceed 40 pounds on the big wig airlines and 25 pounds on the not so big wig airlines.

If you are abroad, carry a backpack or light squish-able duffel. European airlines have extremely strict carry-on dimensions. Weight is a big factor, as well. Air France and Alitalia limit carry-ons to 21 X 13 X 9 inches with a max weight of 26.4 pounds. Carry-on bags on Lufthansa, Swiss, and Turkish can be 21 X 15 X 9 inches but these airlines counterattack with a max weight of 17.6 pounds.

New seats and floatation devices often means less than eight inches of clearance for bags under the seat in front of you with a maximum width of 14 inches. The middle seat in a three seat row has even less space under the seat.

Our advice, if you know you will be heading abroad or traveling different size planes, it’s worth it to buy a light, smaller carry-on around 21 X 13 X 9 inches. A bag that size will fly almost anywhere if you don’t stuff it with heavy, unforgiving objects. Remember, overhead bins aren’t “very” pliable, so be sure to measure your carry-on before you haul it all the way to the gate, only to be forced to check it.

[ad_2]

Categories
Uncategorized

An Article on the Growth of Aviation in India

[ad_1]

· The civil aviation industry in India has emerged as one of the fastest growing industries in the country during the last three years. India is currently considered the third largest domestic civil aviation market in the world. India is expected to become the world’s largest domestic civil aviation market in the next 10 to 15 years, as per Mr Jayant Sinha, Union Minister of State for Civil Aviation, Government of India.

· According to International Air Transport Association (IATA), India will displace the UK for the third place in 2025.

· The Civil Aviation industry has ushered in a new era of expansion, driven by factors such as low-cost carriers (LCCs), modern airports, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in domestic airlines, advanced information technology (IT) interventions and growing emphasis on regional connectivity.

Market Size

· Domestic air traffic rose to 17.69 per cent year-on-year in December 2017, continuing its double digit growth, according to the civil aviation regulator Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA). About 11.24 million passengers flew in December 2017, up from 9.55 million a year earlier. Passengers carried by domestic airlines during 2017 were 117.1 million as against 99.89 million during the corresponding period of previous year, thereby registering a growth of 17.31 per cent, as per the DGCA.

· As of December 2017, the existing fleet of aircraft stands at 548 aircraft in India, and another 920 aircraft are expected to be inducted into the fleet by 2025.

Investment

· According to data released by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), FDI inflows in air transport (including air freight) between April 2000 and September 2017 stood at US$ 1.59 billion.

· India is estimated to see an investment of US $25 billion in the next decade in the airports sector, and traffic growth of 13 per cent, according to Morgan Stanley. According to them, the share of air travel in air and rail travel combined in India will grow to 15.2 per cent by 2027 from 7.9 per cent now.

· Capex plans to the tune of Rs 65,000 crore (US$ 10.08 billion) have been finalized by the Airports Authority of India with Rs 17,500 crore (US$ 27.13 billion) for the next five years and around Rs 22,000 crore (US$ 3.41 billion) for brownfield expansion in Delhi, Mumbai, Hyderabad and Bengaluru by private operators and around Rs 21,000 crore (US$ 32.55 billion) for greenfield airports.

Key investments and developments in India’s aviation industry include:

· The Airports Authority of India (AAI) will undertake new development works at Luck now, Deoghar, Rajkot and Allahabad airports.

· The objective is to improve and develop airport infrastructure to meet growing traffic demands. AAI plans to construct new integrated passenger terminal building at ChaudharyCharan Singh International Airport, Luck now at an estimated cost of Rs. 1,230 crore (US$ 190.65 million). The new terminal will be able to handle 4000 passengers during peak hour and 6.35 million passengers per annum.

Government Initiatives

Some major initiatives undertaken by the government are:

· Under the second round of Regional Connectivity Scheme (RCS 2) the government has awarded 325 routes to airlines as well as helicopter operators with the objective of enhancing flight services to hilly and remote areas. Under the scheme airline operators have to offer half of their seats at discounted rates and helicopter operators can offer up to 13 seats at lower fares with the government providing Viability Gap Funding (VGF) or subsidy to airlines and helicopter operators.

· Constructing 17 highways-cum-airstrips are the government’s priorities and it will start work on them this year, Union Minister NitinGadkari has said. The projects are designed in such a fashion that the roads will double up as airstrips and traffic will be stopped when an airplane lands or takes off. The road and air connectivity will also provide better access to remote areas.

· Airport building and modernization projects worth over Rs 19,300 crore (US$ 2.99 billion) have been recommended green clearance, in line with the Government of India’s focus on improvement in regional air connectivity.

Conclusion

· India’s aviation industry is largely untapped with huge growth opportunities, considering that air transport is still expensive for majority of the country’s population, of which nearly 40 per cent is the upwardly mobile middle class.

· The industry stakeholders should engage and collaborate with policy makers to implement efficient and rational decisions that would boost India’s civil aviation industry. With the right policies and relentless focus on quality, cost and passenger interest, India would be well placed to achieve its vision of becoming the third-largest aviation market by 2025.

· In the coming 20 years, Indian companies will buy 2,100 new planes worth US$ 290 billion. Also, domestic air traffic in India is expected to cross 150 million in FY19, on the back of unprecedented capacity induction by airlines*.

[ad_2]

Categories
Uncategorized

The Stages of US Airline Deregulation

[ad_1]

I. Regulation

Although US airline deregulation was initially envisioned as leading to an increased number of carriers whose divergent service concepts, market segments, fleets, and route structures would have produced new competition, stimulated traffic, and lowered fares, it ultimately came full cycle and only resulted in virtual monopoly. Three distinct stages occurred during its evolution.

The regulation itself traces its origin to 1938 when Congress adopted the Civil Aeronautics Act. Its resultant five-member Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), formed two years later in 1940, regulated fares, authorized routes, awarded subsidies, and approved interline agreements, among other functions.

“Regulation, by definition, substitutes the judgment of the regulator for that of the marketplace,” according to Elizabeth E. Bailey, David R. Graham, and Daniel P. Kaplan in their book, Deregulating the Airlines (The MIT Press, 1985, p. 96).

So regulated had the environment been, in fact, that an airline often had to resort to the purchase of another carrier just to obtain its route authority. Delta Air Lines, for example, long interested in providing nonstop service between New York and Florida, continually petitioned the CAB for the rights. But the regulatory agency felt that Northeast, a small local service carrier often plagued by low traffic, financial loss, and bad weather because of its route system, needed the lucrative Florida route’s revenue potential to boost it back to health and granted it the authority instead.

Undaunted, Delta ultimately resorted to acquiring the regional carrier and subsequently received approval for the merger on April 24, 1972. But these extremes would shortly no longer be needed.

A glimpse of the future could already be had in California and Texas. Devoid of jurisdiction over local air transportation, the CAB could neither exercise fare nor route authority over intrastate airlines and these carriers, usually offering high-frequency, single-class, no-frills service at half the fares the regulated “trunk” airlines were forced to charge, consistently recorded both profit and traffic growth.

Air California and PSA Pacific Southwest Airlines, for example, operating in the Los Angeles-San Francisco market, saw yearly traffic figures increase from 1.5 million passengers in 1960 to 3.2 million in 1965. Texas-based Southwest Airlines similarly provided low-fare service between Dallas and Houston and other Texas points. These airlines demonstrated that true deregulation could yield fares accessible to average-income passengers, provide greater airline and service concept choice, and stimulate traffic.

Passengers and government alike increasingly decried regulation during the mid-1970s, citing the examples set by Air California, PSA, Southwest, and other intrastate airlines as demonstrable proof that deregulation could produce mutual airline- and passenger-benefit. At least that was the theory.

Ultimately conceding to reason and democratic rule, President Jimmy Carter signed the Airline Deregulation Act on October 28, 1978, in the process eliminating the need for CAB approval of route entrance and exit and reducing most of the current fare restrictions. Even those would eventually be eliminated when the Civil Aeronautics Board, in its now famous “sunset,” was disbanded in 1985.

At the time of the event, eleven then-designated “trunk” carriers collectively controlled 87.2 percent of the domestic revenue passenger miles (RPMs), while 12 regionals, 258 commuters, five supplemental, and four intrastates provided the balance of the RPM distribution. Which would still ply the skies when deregulation’s dust settled?

II. Deregulation

Stage One: New Generation Airlines:

Like the California and Texas intrastate airlines, an increasing number of nontraditional, deregulation-spawned carriers initially infiltrated the US market. The first of these, Midway Airlines, was the first to receive certification after the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act and the first to actually inaugurate service, in 1979.

Founded three years earlier by Irwing Tague, a former Hughes Airwest executive, Midway inaugurated low-fare, high-frequency, no-frills “Rainbow Jet” service in November of that year from Chicago’s underutilized Midway Airport-which was once the city’s only airfield until O’Hare was built and which Midway hoped to resurrect the same way Southwest had at Dallas’s Love Field–with five single-class, 86-passenger, former TWA DC-9-10s, initially to Cleveland, Detroit, and Kansas City. Its low fare structure fostered rapid growth and it strategically hoped to penetrate the Chicago market without attracting O’Hare competition from the established carriers.

But, having been employed by Midway, the author can attest that it quickly learned three vital lessons, which indicated that it would have to remain tremendously flexible in order to survive under prevailing competitive market conditions:

Although it served a secondary Chicago-area airport, it first and foremost still competed in the Chicago market.

Secondly, once the incumbent airlines lowered their fares, its load factors declined.

Finally, the high-density, low-fare strategy, which had become the principle characteristics of deregulation-spawned upstarts, was ineffective when an airline attempted to cater to a specific market segment, such as the higher yield business one, where increased comfort and service were expected.

Resultantly, Midway modified its strategy by introducing a conservative cream-colored livery; single-class, four-abreast business cabin seating with increased legroom; additional carry-on luggage space; and upgraded, complimentary-wine in-flight service in exchange for higher than Rainbow Jet fares, but those which were still below the major carriers’ unrestricted coach tariffs.

The newly implemented strategy, dubbed “Midway Metrolink,” significantly reduced the number of seats per aircraft. While its DC-9-10s and -30s had respectively accommodated 86 and 115 passengers, for example, they were reconfigured for only 60 and 84 under the new Metrolink strategy.

Apparently successful, it sparked explosive growth, from an initial 56,040 passengers in 1979 to almost 1.2 million in 1983.

Capitol Air, another deregulation-transformed carrier of which the author had equally been a part, also experienced initial, rapid expansion. Formed in 1946 as Capitol Airways, it had commenced domestic charter service with Curtiss C-46 Commandos and DC-4s, eventually acquiring larger L-049 Constellations, and by 1950 became the fifth largest US supplemental carrier after World Airways, Overseas National (ONA), Trans International (TIA), and Universal. It acquired the first of what was to become one of the largest used-Super Constellation fleets in January of 1960, eventually operating 17 L-749s, L-1049Gs, and L-1049Hs during the 14-year period from 1955 to 1968.

Redesignated Capitol International Airways, the charter airline took delivery of its first pure-jet in September of 1963, a DC-8-30, and subsequently operated four versions of the McDonnell-Douglas design, inclusive of the -30, -50, -61, and -63 series, which replaced the Lockheed Constellation as the workhorse of its fleet.

Receiving scheduled authority in September of 1978, Capitol inaugurated New York-Brussels service on May 5 of the following year and a second, Chicago/Boston-Brussels transatlantic sector on June 19. Like PSA and Southwest, Capitol Air, a former supplemental carrier, was not regulated by the CAB and therefore conducted its own “deregulation experiment” by sublimating proven charter economics of single-class, high-density, low unrestricted and even standby fares to scheduled service in order to attain low seat-mile costs and profitability.

The scheduled concept, branded “Sky Saver Service,” consistently attracted capacity-exceeding demand and sparked considerable fleet and route system expansion. Operating six DC-8-61s, five DC-8-63s, and five DC-10-10s to seven US domestic, three Caribbean, and three European destinations from a New York-JFK hub by 1982, it attracted an ever-increasing passenger base: 611,400 passengers in 1980, 1,150,000 in 1981, and 1,824,000 in 1982.

Passengers, unaware of deregulation-molded carriers whose low fares could only attain profitability with used aircraft, high-density seating, and lower-wage nonunion employees, often voiced criticism about Capitol Air’s non-interline policy and refusal to provide meals and hotel rooms during delays and compensation during missed, other-airline connections. Nevertheless, its fares in the New York-Los Angeles market ranged from an unrestricted $149 based upon a round-trip purchase to a one-way $189, while the majors’ unrestricted tariffs in the market hovered at the $450 mark. As a result, Capitol Air’s load factors exceeded 90 percent.

By September of 1981 ten new carriers received operating certificates and inaugurated service.

“The first effects of deregulation were dramatic,” wrote Anthony Sampson in Empires of the Sky: The Politics, Contests, and Cartels of World Airlines (Random House, 1984, p. 136). “A new breed of air entrepreneurs saw the chance to expand small companies or to establish ‘instant airlines’ which could undercut fares on local routes; they could dispense with much of the superstructure and bureaucracy of the big airlines and could use their flexibility to hit the giants at their weakest points where they could make quick returns.”

Four types of airline types emerged and exerted considerable initial impact on the traditionally regulated airline industry.

The first were the deregulation-spawned upstarts, such as Air Atlanta, Air Florida, Air One, Altair, America West, Best, Carnival, Empire, Florida Express, Frontier Horizon, Jet America, Midway, Midwest Express, MGM Grand Air, Morris Air, Muse Air, New York Air, Northeastern International, Pacific East Air, Pacific Express, PEOPLExpress, Presidential, Reno Air, SunJet International, The Hawaii Express, and ValuJet.

The second were the deregulation-matured local service carriers, including Allegheny, Frontier, Hughes Airwest, North Central, Ozark, Piedmont, Southern, and Texas International, which quickly outgrew their former, regulation-imposed geographic concentrations.

The third, the boundary-crossing intrastate airlines, encompassed companies such as Air California (later AirCal), Alaska, Aloha, Hawaiian, PSA, Southwest, and Wien Air Alaska.

The fourth were the deregulation-transformed charters, such as Capitol Air, Trans International (later Transamerica), and World Airways.

Although some of these carriers, particularly Air One and MGM Grand Air, targeted very specific market niches by offering premium seating and service, the vast majority, whether spawned, raised, or matured by deregulative parenting, attained (or attempted to attain) profitability by means of several core operating characteristics, including, of course, low, unrestricted fares, single-hub, short- to medium-range route systems, high-density seating, limited onboard service, lower wage nonunion work forces, and medium-range, medium-capacity trijets, such as the 727, and short-range, low-capacity twinjets, such as the BAC-111, the DC-9, the 737, and the F.28.

All achieved high load factors, generated tremendous traffic in existing and emerging markets, and created considerable competition.

“In this respect,” wrote Barbara Sturken Peterson and James Glab in their book, Rapid Descent: Deregulation and the Shakeout in the Airlines (Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 307), “deregulation worked like a charm.”

Stage Two: Monopoly:

Although the established, traditionally regulated major carriers temporarily lowered their fares in selected high deregulation airline-concentrated markets in order to retain their passenger bases, the established airlines, long nurtured and protected by regulation, were not structured for profitable operation with them. Yet even in those cases where they managed to eliminate competition from the market, another low-fare upstart seemed waiting in the wings to fill the void.

The incumbent carriers were thus faced with the choice of relinquishing painstakingly developed markets or dwindle financial resources to retain passengers until they themselves slipped into bankruptcy. It quickly became apparent that the deregulation-sparked fare reductions would become permanent elements of the “new” unregulated airline industry and the major carriers eventually discovered that they had to fundamentally restructure themselves or succumb to the new breed of airlines. Almost every aspect of their operations would, in the end, be transformed.

The first aspect targeted was the route system. Traditionally comprised of point-to-point, nonstop service, which had its origins in 1940 and 1950 CAB route authorizations, these route systems actually contained no inherent “system” at all, and consisted instead of unbalanced geographical encompassments that resulted in lost revenue to other carriers and inefficient, uneconomical use of existing fleets. What was really needed was a centralized “collecting point” for self-feed.

Because of bilateral agreements, European carriers actually operated the first “hubs,” channeling passengers from, say, Copenhagen to Athens by means of an intermediate connecting point such as Dusseldorf. Any passenger flying either the Copenhagen-Dusseldorf or Athens-Dusseldorf sector could theoretically transfer to any of the airline’s outward-radiating flight spokes, vastly increasing the number of markets potentially served. These European capital hubs also demonstrated increased aircraft utilization, improved traffic flow, a larger market base than traditional point-to-point service relying only on origin-and-destination traffic could have supported, and retention of the connecting passenger.

“Although passengers prefer frequent nonstop service, such service can be quite costly,” according to Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan (p. 74). “Airlines thus face strong incentives to establish hub-and-spoke operations… By combining passengers with different origins and destinations, a carrier can increase the average number of passengers per flight and thereby reduce costs. Essentially the broader scope of operation lets the carrier take advantage of the economies of scale in aircraft. At the same time a hub-and-spoke operation provides more convenient service for travelers in less heavily traveled markets.”

The first US hub had its origins in the 1940s when the government, attempting to develop the south, awarded Delta some profitable, long-range routes in exchange for its agreement to serve several small communities from Atlanta.

“All of these routes became the ‘spokes’ leading into a Delta ‘hub’ at Atlanta,” said Peterson and Glab (p. 120). “With it came the compelling benefit of passenger retention.”

Allegheny, formerly a Pittsburgh-based local service carrier without a distinctive long-range development plan, recorded considerable success on its eastern and mid-Atlantic state route network, which had progressively “evolved” because of its Pennsylvania funneling point. Increasing the balance of its predominantly business and small community route system with longer-range sectors to leisure-oriented destinations, it was further able to nurture this evolution and by 1978 73 percent of its passengers connected. By 1981 this figure rose to 89 percent-meaning that 89 percent of those flying to Philadelphia and Pittsburgh were not flying to Philadelphia and Pittsburgh.

The Delta and Allegheny hubs were only the beginning of the phenomenon, since the concept did more than create airline concentration in a particular city. Instead, it resulted in an ultimate monopolistic strangulation that precluded any competition.

At four of the major US hubs (Atlanta, Chicago-O’Hare, Dallas-Ft. Worth, and Denver), for example, “the two largest carriers have simply squeezed out or have made it virtually impossible for other airlines to expand and gain market share,” wrote Julius Maldutis in Airline Competition at the 50 Largest US Airports since Deregulation (Salomon Brothers, Inc., 1987, p. 4).

In Atlanta, where both Delta and Eastern once had hubs, the possibility of any significant third-carrier competition was eliminated. In 1978, for instance, Delta’s and Eastern’s hub traffic percentages were respectively 49.65- and 39.17-percent, while nine years later these figures had increased to 52.51- and 42.24-percent.

Analysis of the 50 largest airports (which represented 81.1 percent of US scheduled passenger enplanements) indicated that only ten of these airports could have been considered less than highly concentrated. On the other hand, 40 (or 80 percent) of the airports had excessive amounts of concentration. The ten most concentrated airports had one airline that had more than a 66-percent market share of passenger enplanements.

In St. Louis, where both TWA and Ozark operated hubs, the former enjoyed a 39.06- percent market share, while the latter had a 20.21-percent of it in 1978. In 1986 these corresponding figures respectively increased to 63.16 and 19.68 percent. The following year, after TWA acquired Ozark, its only other significant competitor, it parlayed this share into 82.34 percent with nine other US domestic airlines sharing the remaining 17.66 percent. An airline computer listing, reflecting all carriers operating between New York’s three major airports and St. Louis on December 1, 1995, revealed 27 flights on this day. Not one of them was operated by a carrier other than TWA! This was power.

Similarly, deregulation-matured Piedmont, which only captured a 10.19-percent market share in Charlotte, North Carolina, in 1977, parlayed this into a monopolistic 87.87-percent a decade later after having established a hub there. The same transformation occurred in Pittsburgh with Allegheny/USAir/US Airways-43.65 percent in 1977 and 82.83 percent in 1987.

“Since a large proportion of city-pair markets cannot support convenient nonstop service, hub-and-spoke operations have proved to be the dominant strategy of air carriers since deregulation,” wrote Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan (p. 196). “There has been a significant shift away from the regulatory vision of linear systems and toward sunbursts of routes.”

Aside from the hubbing concept, the major carriers experienced several other fundamental changes. Aircraft, for example, were reconfigured for higher-density-and, in some cases, single-class-seating, while business cabins augmented first class and coach sections on selected routes; first class cabins were later altogether replaced by those of business class in a trend-following pattern sparked by some special-niche deregulation airlines.

Fuel-inefficient aircraft types were gradually replaced by new-generation designs and daily utilization increased-from 8.6 hours in 1971 to 10.3 hours in 1979. During the 1970s and early 1980s average aircraft size increased on long-range sectors, while during the late-1980s the size increased in all categories. During the early 1990s pure-jet technology for the first time penetrated all markets-from the 50-passenger regional to the 500-passenger intercontinental.

Employment was also metamorphosed. According to Robert Crandall, former chairman and chief executive officer of American Airlines, “deregulation is profoundly anti-labor… there has been a massive transfer of wealth from airline employees to airline passengers.”

The deregulation-spawned airlines’ fare reductions produced a lower revenue and profit base from which funding could be rechanneled into traditionally high employment salaries and benefit packages, thus necessitating increased employee productivity, cross-utilization, part-time, nonunion, profit-sharing measures. In some cases, employment was actually provided by contracted ground service companies in order to reduce benefit compensation. The author was involved in the initial ground service company experiment at JFK International Airport between Triangle Aviation Services and Royal Jordanian Airlines.

“A relatively new, but quickly developing concept, the service company provides the personnel on a contractual basis to the particular carrier for which a certain amount per daily turn-around is assessed, according to Airport-Based Airline Careers (Hicksville, New York, 1995, p. 9). “The service company then hires the personnel, conducts the training programs (if any), and determines the hourly wage and benefit package.”

Having worn Royal Jordanian’s uniform and provided all ground operations functions, I often felt “caught in the middle,” simultaneously attempting to please both the passenger and the airline. After all, they were both my customer, revealing the concept’s inherent conflict.

Reduced airline employment wages and benefits actually trace their origins to Crandall himself who devised a plan to reduce employment costs with a “B-scale” payment scheme that initially offered lower salaries to newly-hired employees and required them to accrue greater longevity before they could attain the higher “A-scale” levels.

“American (itself) was poised to increase enormously in size, and it had a strong incentive to so,” said Peterson and Glab (p. 136). “The more it expanded, the more workers it would hire-all at lower B-scale wages-and the more its average costs would drop.”

According to Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan in their work, Deregulating the Airlines, regulation created above-industry standard monetary and benefit compensation. “It is now clear that inflexible work rules and higher than competitive pay flourished during regulation. Airline employees appear to have benefited substantially from CAB’s protective regulation.” (p. 197)

Yet another deregulation-sparked necessity was the increasing reliance on automation. American Airlines, again led by Crandall, created the first computerized airline reservation system, SABRE, which was immediately followed by United’s Apollo System. As powerful sales tools, these automated systems were purchased by travel agents who paid a varying fee to their owners for each booking made while smaller carriers had to negotiate for representation.

So sophisticated and multifaceted did these systems become that their information was progressively sublimated through each aspect of the airline’s operation with their “reservation modes” providing reservations, itineraries, fares, hotel, tour, and ground transportation bookings, frequent flier mile tracking, and ticketing; their “departure control systems” (DCS) providing passenger check-in and boarding pass issuance; and their “controller modes” utilizing this information for aircraft weight and balance and load plan and load sheet generation.

It is only through these sophisticated airline reservation systems that carriers were able to implement “yield management” programs-that is, the determination of the optimized balance of passenger-attracting low fares and profit-generating high fares based upon seasonality, departure time, demand, convenience, capacity, and competition to produce an ultimately profitable flight. An airline reservation system consultation, for instance, listed 27 separate fares between New York and Los Angeles on December 1, 1995 just with American Airlines, ranging from an unrestricted $1,741.82 one-way first class fare to a highly restricted $226.36 round-trip coach fare. The codes in the “Fare Basis” column, such as “KPE7HOLN,” were accessed in order to reveal the restrictions attached to each–the printout of which spanned several pages!

Another fundamental change to the deregulated industry was both the structure of and relationship of the regional and commuter carriers to the majors. Because history is sometimes cyclic, the pattern once demonstrated by the local service airlines of abandoning small community, low-density routes when they acquired pure-jet aircraft once again occurred, but now with two primary differences: (1). The present-day regionals were never, by regulation, restricted to these routes, and (2). Although rapidly-expanding with pure-jet fleets of their own, they attempted to coexist, rather than compete, with the majors through code-share agreements in which their aircraft appeared in major-resembling liveries and their flights carried the affiliated airline’s two-letter codes.

Of the 300 destinations served by Delta during the latter part of 1995, for example, 85 of these were actually reached by one of its four “Delta Connection” code-share carriers, including Atlantic Southeast Airlines (ASA), Business Express, Comair, and Skywest-only the first of which had yet to acquire pure-jet equipment at that time. American outwardly purchased its own commuter-feed airlines and collectively designated them “American Eagle.”

Nevertheless, the major carriers’ deregulation-necessitated restructuring was complete.

When TWA matched Capitol Air’s unrestricted transcontinental coach fares, the former supplemental recorded 30-passenger bookings on DC-8-61 aircraft otherwise able to accommodate 252 and canceled its flights. In a similar situation, when established USAir’s and upstart’s PEOPLExpress’s load factors were analyzed in the Buffalo-Newark market between August of 1981 and June of 1982, the latter consistently reported those that were at least 20 points lower.

“The data thus suggests that many consumers chose to travel on the carrier with the greater name recognition and amenities when the fare is the same,” continued Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan (p. 106).

Competition ultimately forced Capitol Air to realign its route system to include an increasing number of ethnic and un- and underserved markets until the majors also encroached on this territory and the carrier was left with little choice but to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, ceasing operations on November 25, 1984.

Midway equally encountered major-carrier opposition. Indeed, whatever strategy it implemented to define its optimum niche, it was always counteracted by the aggressive majors. Acquiring Air Florida in 1984, for example, it reconfigured its aircraft with dual-class seating, but riding on both sides of a seesaw, it soon swung back to the single-class concept and in November of 1989 once again to the dual-class one, by which time it operated an 82-strong fleet with its “Midway Connection” affiliation and carried 5.2 million yearly passengers.

But over-expansion and an attempt to replace Eastern at its Philadelphia hub during poor economic times in direct competition with USAir resulted in its own demise two years later, on November 13.

“Although these numerous strategies indicated a constant reassessment of its proper course, they also indicated the instability of market conditions in deregulated skies and the airline’s determination to remain in them and its resiliency to navigate them with a juxtaposition of service concepts, cabin configurations, seating densities, and marketing strategies,” according to The McDonnell-Douglas DC-9 (Hicksville, New York, 1991, p. 59).

Capitol Air and Midway were only two examples of deregulation-matured carriers that succumbed to the radically restructured majors. Indeed, of the approximately 100 airlines that had been certified since the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act, only one, America West, was still in operation at the end of 1995.

“(The major airlines) implemented a strategy with which they could beat the lower-fare competition at its own game by aggressively expanding and charging comparable fares, despite high losses on certain routes, all in an effort to maintain-or, in some cases, to regain-market share… The major carriers grew mighty and monopolistic by eliminating competition wherever it was encountered,” according to the Austrian Airlines Passenger Handling Manual-JFK (Hicksville, New York, 1990, pp. 10-11).

Stage Three: Megacarrier:

Airline expansion, once set in motion, seemed self-propelled and resisted inertia. Monopolies, by definition, know no boundaries. The logical next step was foreign market penetration.

Unlike US domestic growth, however, “it was a lot tougher for a US airline to gain access to a new foreign market than to a new domestic one, because international air services were still tightly regulated by bilateral agreements between the United States and foreign governments,” wrote Peterson and Glab (p. 283). “… To win immediate operating rights to a foreign country, a US carrier had to buy the route authority from another US airline.”

The phenomenon, it will be recalled, was a virtual repetition of the US domestic governmental structure prior to deregulation. Such a purchase in the latter case was usually only granted if the route-authorized airline was in financial difficulty and needed the revenue generated by the sale to remain viable.

Pan Am, particularly hammered by deregulation’s effects, was forced to sell its lucrative Pacific division, along with aircraft and ground facilities, to United for $750 million to remain afloat. United, already then a large, financially sound airline, now had a global route network with proper domestic feed.

More important than the sale, however, was its far-reaching implications. “The United Airlines purchase of Pan Am’s Pacific division was to set off a domino effect,” continued Peterson and Glab (p. 148) “Many airlines were alarmed at the new competition they faced, especially Northwest, which objected to the nation’s largest airline moving onto its Pacific turf. Northwest knew it would need a substantially bigger domestic network of its own, and the fastest way to get one would be through a merger.”

By the end of 1986 it had done just that, acquiring Republic, which itself had been formed by the North Central-Southern merger in 1979 and the secondary Hughes Airwest acquisition in 1980, and the strategy rewarded Northwest with monopolistic status at all of its hubs, such as Minneapolis, with an 81.55-percent market share.

Delta, fearing it would be unable to compete with airlines of such magnitude, acquired Western Airlines for $860 million in September of 1986, in the process obtaining a coast-to-coast route structure and new hubs in Salt Lake City and Los Angeles.

The already described TWA-Ozark merger produced such a lock on St. Louis that it controlled three-quarters of all gates and was able to assess much higher fares in those markets where there was no competition.

In fact, these mergers only served to tighten a carrier’s already almost unrelenting grip on a particular hub. Deregulation-spawned Empire, for instance-a rapidly-expanding New York State Fokker F.28 Fellowship operator-adopted a Syracuse hub and recorded an initial 1979 market share of just.75 percent, but this exponentially increased to 27.36 percent in 1985 when Piedmont acquired the growing regional. Two years later, its market share climbed to 39.82 percent. However, when USAir in turn purchased Piedmont, the Syracuse hub lock skyrocketed to over 61 percent.

Perhaps the most encompassing (and disjointed) merger was that between PEOPLExpress and Continental, which itself had already been the result of an amalgamation between the original, pre-deregulation Continental, Texas International, and New York Air. PEOPLExpress had equally already absorbed Denver-based Frontier. Texas Air, owner of the new conglomerate, also acquired Eastern, but retained its separate identity.

All these mergers, consummated during the latter half of 1986, unequivocally produced the “megacarrier.”

“Deregulation’s theme, echoing Darwinian philosophy, clearly demonstrated itself to be ‘survival of the fittest,’ which, for the airlines, translated as ‘survival of the largest,’ according to the Austrian Airlines Passenger Service Manual-JFK (p. 10). “If the long-established major carriers… wished to survive and maintain the markets they had so carefully nurtured during regulation, they would somehow have to implement a strategy which would ensure that they would remain ‘large.'”

The major airlines’ fundamental restructuring, beginning with monopoly and ending with megacarrier, constituted that strategy, as carriers tracing their origins to the infantile days of aviation and bearing names virtually synonymous with the industry fell like a string of acquisition-induced dominoes. By 1995 only seven US megacarriers remained, including American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, TWA, United, and USAir, along with two significant majors-America West and Southwest-a few “niche” airlines, and the regional-commuters which were almost exclusively aligned with one of the megacarriers or majors through code-share agreements.

Even these names disappeared early in the 21st century. Like brides and grooms walking down a monopoly-destined aisle, Delta married Northwest, United took Continental as its lawfully wedded, American joined arms with US Airways, and Southwest tied the knot with AirTran.

III. Conclusion

Although the examples set by Air California, PSA, and Southwest had indicated that a deregulated environment would ultimately prove to be mutually advantageous to both the operating airline and the passenger, these experiments failed to approximate actual conditions, since the rest of the US airline industry was still regulated and these fledgling airlines had therefore been insulated from major-carrier competition. Lacking the authority, cost structure, and equipment, they had been unable to launch comparable service of their own.

The initial proliferation of small, low-fare, no-frills, non-unionized deregulation-spawned, -bred, and -transformed airlines provided tremendous airline-, fare-, and service concept-choice only until the major carriers implemented their fundamental route system, aircraft, employment, computerized reservation system, and regional airline affiliation restructuring, reversing the expansion phase into one of buyout, merger, bankruptcy, retrenchment, consolidation, monopoly, and, ultimately, megacarrier. The upstarts, having lacked the majors’ name recognition, financial strength, frequent flier marketing tools, and size, invariably succumbed, leaving most of the original dominant airlines, although in greatly modified form, until even these surrendered to prevailing forces. US airline deregulation had thus come full cycle.

[ad_2]